I HAVE no doubt that a two-party system is better than the one-party state we currently live in. However, what is desirable is not necessarily viable.
As I have argued, blind faith in the feasibility of a two-party system may lead to either one-party predominance (under the Barisan Nasional [BN] or Pakatan Rakyat [PR]), or a palace- or military-backed regime.
Three conditions
In brief, the establishment of a two-party system in Malaysia requires three conditions:
The majority of voters must support only two parties (or coalitions), and the parties' electoral strength must be comparable, if not roughly equal. To put it bluntly, there can be no two-party competition if the majority of voters concentrate their votes on only one party.
The political system must be sufficiently fair for the weaker of the two parties (the opposition) to win representation and control some political resources. This requires a clear separation between party and state, as well as a fair and reasonably proportionate electoral system.
The second and third conditions are interrelated, in that they determine how the competitors would behave in democratic or undemocratic environments. In other words, if losing the game means losing everything, the players are likely to pursue victory at all costs.
What emerged on 8 March 2008 was only the fulfilment of the first condition for a two-party system. The second condition was hardly fulfilled as PR lawmakers and state governments are still marginalised or undermined by the BN. The third condition is still absent, as manifested by Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim's 16 Sept government-by-defections plot, the BN's Perak takeover, and the recent defections of Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) lawmakers.
Dangerous assumptions
The danger of treating a two-party system as a fait accompli is that voters may vote as if they are living in a real democracy. Voters may form their choices based on various issues and may be driven by local concerns or personalities.
This may result in a somewhat close match, which would fulfil the first, "equal strength" condition for a two-party system. However, it is a huge disadvantage to be in the opposition as the second, "fairness" condition remains unsatisfied. Therefore, the loser may not be willing to accept the outcome and thus resort to undemocratic means of grabbing power leaving the third, "democratic consolidation" condition unsatisfied.
Both parties should be of equal strength
To prevent such a scenario, the winner might entice the losing party's lawmakers to cross over. If necessary, the winner might also court the support of the palace, military and likely the religious authorities. In the end, there will only be either a one-party state (under the BN or PR) or a coup-installed regime. The two-party system thus ceases to be a viable option.
What if the winner wins a comfortable seat margin, either because of increased votes or electoral manipulation? As long as political parties and elites still do not see the voters' verdict as supreme, the winner may still try to entice the loser's lawmakers to defect. So, again we will not end up with a two-party system. This is in fact what seems to be happening to PKR now, with its lawmakers' defections and resignations.
To recap, as long as the federal opposition parties are discriminated against, the "fairness" condition for a genuine two-party system will remain absent. And as long as the parties and politicians refuse to accept election outcomes as final, the "democratic consolidation" condition for a two-party system will remain absent. Therefore, even if the voters' collective choice results in two-party competition, like what happened post-March 2008, this may eventually give way to either one-party predominance (via defections) or, worse, a coup-installed regime.
Two-party road map
While a two-party system is unattainable in the short run, it is possible in the longer term — after democratisation.
The first question before Malaysian democrats is: of the BN's one-party predominance, the PR's one-party predominance, and a coup-installed regime, which would most likely facilitate a two-party system? By a process of elimination, the answer cannot be a coup-installed regime, which would inevitably divide the population bitterly. So we are left with the choice between a dominant BN and a dominant PR.
(Map pic by virsh / sxc.hu)The second question is: how can we ensure the chosen coalition will uphold democratic transition? The answer is, we need a political contract with the chosen coalition that explicitly promises democratisation.
The pact must contain the coalition's explicit and categorical commitments to:
Federalism and local elections. This would ensure that even if the coalition fully controls the federal government and Parliament, it may still be checked by lower-level governments. You can't have an electoral one-party state if different parties run the federal, state and municipal governments.
Democratic candidate selection and representative recall. Election candidates cannot be subjectively decided by only the top leadership of the coalition. There should be a primary mechanism so that the public can be consulted and the most qualified individuals are able to offer themselves as candidates. The electorate must also be allowed to initiate a recall of representatives who underperform or betray their mandates. This would effectively curb defections.
In brief, I am proposing that the next general election should have only one theme for voters: democratisation. The coalition that is willing to commit to the highest degree of democratisation should be adopted as the vehicle of change and supported fully by all Malaysian democrats.
Considering the BN's appalling democratic track record, it seems at the moment that the PR is the only viable choice for our preferred "democratisation alliance". But would the PR be willing to sign a contract with Malaysian voters to democratise this country? I don't know.
So far, the PR has been very much a "good governance alliance" with little interest in democratisation. If they are still not keen, then civil society should seriously consider building a third force, even if it means risking a coup.
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