COMMENT Mahinda Rajapakse despite
his nationalist appeal lost his bid for a third-term presidency in Sri
Lanka. He gained 47.58 percent of votes whereas his former colleague and
recently turned opponent, Maithripala Sirisena, obtained 51.28 percent
of votes. It was a surprise for Sri Lankans as well as for outsiders.
Many believed that there was nothing to stop Rajapakse from going for
his third term in the elections held on 8 Jan 2015.
Sirisena, who quit his post in the cabinet of Rajapakse in November last year, had been doing his homework for some time. Eventually, just before the elections, he teamed up with Ranil Wickramasinghe, the leader of the United National Party (UNP); Chandrika Kumaratunga, the former president of Sri Lanka; the former chief justice Shirani Bandaranaike; and other prominent leaders to form a loose coalition to unseat Rajapakse. Rajapakse said that Sirisena “stabbed” him from the rear!
There was a common thinking in Rajapakse’s close circles that the incumbent might not face much difficulty in the contest and given the expected solid support from the Sinhala south, the gains that might accrue from Tamil and Muslim communities to Sirisena could be easily offset.
But alas, this was not what happened. Rajapakse not only lost the support of Tamils and Muslims but also from the majority of the Sinhalese. In the north central of the country and other places of Sinhala concentrations, Sirisena obtained the support of the voters. In Tamil areas such as Vanni, Jaffna, Trincomalee, Ampara, and Batticola, voter turnout averaged 75 percent, much higher than previous elections. In the Muslim areas of Puttalam, Ampara, Colombo, and others, voters shied away from Rajapakse to vote for Sirisena.
Amongst Tamils, although there were urgings to boycott the presidential elections, the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) which controls the northern province, took the stand that it would urge Tamils to vote against Rajapakse by supporting Sirisena. It is not that Tamils thought that Sirisena would be able to address their problems, they felt that by voting against the “known enemy”, they might be registering their protest vote for the knowledge of the international community.
The urging for boycott by some Tamil diaspora organisations, although well-intended, failed to appreciate the historic choice available to Tamils and how they could exercise their democratic right in a small measure to bring about long-term desired changes in the country.
Muslim dilemma in Sri Lanka
The Muslims being a smaller minority than the Tamils always faced a dilemma as how to respond to changes in the country dominated by the Buddhist majority Sinhalese. For a long time, despite the injustices meted out to them by the Sinhala racist governments, the Sri Lankan Muslim community, given the division in the leadership, invariably went along with the ruling Sinhala elite. In the course of time, they had to pay dearly for their blind loyalty.
During the Rajapakse administration, Muslim communities were especially targeted for attacks by Sinhala Buddhist extremist organisation such as Bodu Bala Sena. In a recent attack against Muslims in an outskirt of Colombo by Bodu Bala Sena, a Muslim woman deeply affected by the wanton attacks against the Muslim community said that if LTTE leader Prahbakaran was alive, the Muslims would not have to face such cruel and inhumane acts.
Given the kind of attacks against Muslims, two main organisations, the All Ceylon Muslim Congress and Sri Lankan Muslim Congress withdrew their support from Rajapakse’s coalition to support Sirisena. With the entry of these two, a stage was set for the mobilisation of Muslim support for Sirisena. Muslims in Colombo, Puttalam, Ampara, and Batticola overwhelmingly supported Sirisena.
For Tamils and Muslims, Sirisena had nothing to offer in terms of getting their support. However, his campaign for democracy, ending corruption, cancelling the licences of two big casinos, and for the restoration of a two-term presidency, must have attracted Tamils and Muslims to a limited extent. Nonetheless, it should be clear to Sirisena and his new friends that without the support of the Tamils and Muslims, he would not have won the presidency, given the power of incumbency.
Rajapakse faced two surmountable problems that plagued his administrations. First was the problem of putting his family and close friends in high posts in the government. His two brothers – Basil and Gotabhaya – occupy senior posts in the government. Basil is the senior presidential advisor and Gotabhaya is the defence secretary, equivalent to the post of minister of defence. Three members of parliament from the south are his family members. It is said that his family members are in charge of five ministries that control 70 percent of the national budget.
Nepotism and cronyism notwithstanding, the second major problem of Rajapakse was the abolishment of the two-term presidency, as enshrined in the constitution. Rajapakse was two-terms in his office and decided to call for elections on Jan 8, 2015, to go for his third term. However, before this ,he used his parliamentary majority to bring about an amendment (18th amendment) to the constitution to allow himself to go for a third term.
As a result of a ruling by the Supreme Court, the incumbent president could call elections two years ahead of schedule. This was what Rajapakse did to gain power, but was vehemently opposed by the country’s Bar Association, the former chief justice of the Supreme Court Shirani Bandaranaike, and members of the opposition. Subsequently, Rajapakse impeached the chief justice and removed her from the office. Sirisena has promised that if he becomes the president, he would rehabilitate both Sarath Fonseka, who fell out of favour with Rajapakse, and Shirani Bandaranaike.
Wise move to take on Rajapakse
Sirisena will be next president of Sri Lanka. He won the elections not because he promised the heaven, but rather circumstances were much more favourable for him to take on Rajapakse. In fact, he was probably intelligent enough to realise that Rajapakse, despite his nationalistic credentials, was becoming a liability to the Sinhala people, especially the elites.
The criticisms from international human rights organisations about the way he conducted the war, the manner in which thousands of innocent Tamils were murdered, the continuing harassment of Tamils, disappearance of innocent people, land grab in Tamil areas, the attack against minorities, and other undemocratic and oppressive acts have made Rajapakse very unpopular in the civilised world.
Moreover, Rajapakse’s close association with China and Pakistan has alienated the Indian establishment to some extent. In fact, in the last few years after the end of civil war and with little or no development to address genuine Tamil concerns in the north and east, countries like India have been thinking of pursuing the option of regime change.
Given the fact that Sri Lanka falls without the orbit of India’s geopolitical sphere of influence, Rajapakse's regime has become an embarrassment to India. Even after the defeat of the LTTE in the bloody war, Rajapakse has not shown interest in addressing long-standing Tamil concerns. On the contrary, the end of civil war has meant not the end of misery of the Tamil people but the continuation of acts of oppression. Under these circumstances, Sri Lanka has shown no interest in advancing the option of federalism as envisaged in the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord of 1887.
While there is nothing by way development for Tamils, Rajapakse has sought to check Indian influence by giving a free hand to China and Pakistan. It was China’s economic and development assistance that has resulted in the building of ports and other major projects in Sri Lanka. Furthermore, allowing access to Chinese submarines to dock in Sri Lankan seaports has not gone well with India.
India might not have directly interfered in the electoral process, but its ubiquitous intelligence agencies are active and it might not be too incorrect even to tentatively suggest that India probably extended its intelligent arm to support the loose coalition of Sirisena, Wickramesinghe, and Kumaratunga!
Sirisena is no angel
The victory of Sirisena might have brought joy and happiness to some sections of the Tamil Diaspora. Fine, getting rid of “butcher” Rajapakse was something that Tamils in the north and east, victims of the 30-year war, desired. But Tamils having fought many Sinhala regimes in the past only know too well that Sirisena is no angel. In his campaign, he promised nothing to Tamils; he merely said that if elected, he would call for a more independent investigation to address Tamil human rights grievances.
There was nothing to address the concerns of the Muslims as well. Let us not forget, Sirisena was acting defence minister for the Rajapakse government during the height of civil war and before he parted company, was the secretary of Sri Lankan Freedom Party (SLFP) and former health minister.
In other words, why he departed suddenly to challenge Rajapakse would remain a mystery for some time to come. Apparently, in one of the interviews, he said that he lost confidence with Rajapakse as far back as 2006, but why then did he remain so long as his predecessor’s close confidante? While the TNA did the right thing to ask Tamils to vote in the elections, this should not be interpreted as support for Sirisena. Rather it was a protest vote against Rajapakse.
In the Tamil circles, there is also the lingering fear that their participation in the electoral process might dilute their pursuit of a separate country of Eelam. In the last few months or so, Tamil diaspora organisations such as the Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam based in United States have urged a referendum for Tamils whether they wish to opt for separate country or be part of the Sri Lankan political establishment.
Similarly, the Penang Tamil conference in November 2014, among its resolutions, called on the United Nations to conduct a referendum among Eelam Tamil regarding their political future. The history of estranged relations between Tamils and Sinhalese provided the grounds for the LTTE to take up armed struggle in 1977 for the pursuit of separate state.
Although the armed struggle has ceased, the option of separate state has gained ground, more at the political and diplomatic levels. So, if Tamil organisations called for the boycott of the recent elections, then this boycott must be understood in the larger backdrop of relationship between two principled nations, the failure of passive resistance, the move to take up arms, and finally, the urgings for international human rights investigation.
The ouster of Rajapakse was a good thing for Sri Lanka. Narendra Modi, the Prime Minister of India, was one of the leaders who responded early by congratulating Sirisena on his victory and extended invitation to visit India. India must be glad that a major embarrassment in the south has been removed democratically. British Prime Minister Cameron not only congratulated Sirisena, but asked him to allow for the unimpeded international investigation into human rights abuses in Sri Lanka.
It is hoped that the interest of democracy, justice and human rights, Sirisena takes up the challenges that were not addressed but swept under the carpet by Rajapakse.
P RAMASAMY is Perai assemblyperson and Penang deputy chief minister II.
Sirisena, who quit his post in the cabinet of Rajapakse in November last year, had been doing his homework for some time. Eventually, just before the elections, he teamed up with Ranil Wickramasinghe, the leader of the United National Party (UNP); Chandrika Kumaratunga, the former president of Sri Lanka; the former chief justice Shirani Bandaranaike; and other prominent leaders to form a loose coalition to unseat Rajapakse. Rajapakse said that Sirisena “stabbed” him from the rear!
There was a common thinking in Rajapakse’s close circles that the incumbent might not face much difficulty in the contest and given the expected solid support from the Sinhala south, the gains that might accrue from Tamil and Muslim communities to Sirisena could be easily offset.
But alas, this was not what happened. Rajapakse not only lost the support of Tamils and Muslims but also from the majority of the Sinhalese. In the north central of the country and other places of Sinhala concentrations, Sirisena obtained the support of the voters. In Tamil areas such as Vanni, Jaffna, Trincomalee, Ampara, and Batticola, voter turnout averaged 75 percent, much higher than previous elections. In the Muslim areas of Puttalam, Ampara, Colombo, and others, voters shied away from Rajapakse to vote for Sirisena.
Amongst Tamils, although there were urgings to boycott the presidential elections, the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) which controls the northern province, took the stand that it would urge Tamils to vote against Rajapakse by supporting Sirisena. It is not that Tamils thought that Sirisena would be able to address their problems, they felt that by voting against the “known enemy”, they might be registering their protest vote for the knowledge of the international community.
The urging for boycott by some Tamil diaspora organisations, although well-intended, failed to appreciate the historic choice available to Tamils and how they could exercise their democratic right in a small measure to bring about long-term desired changes in the country.
Muslim dilemma in Sri Lanka
The Muslims being a smaller minority than the Tamils always faced a dilemma as how to respond to changes in the country dominated by the Buddhist majority Sinhalese. For a long time, despite the injustices meted out to them by the Sinhala racist governments, the Sri Lankan Muslim community, given the division in the leadership, invariably went along with the ruling Sinhala elite. In the course of time, they had to pay dearly for their blind loyalty.
During the Rajapakse administration, Muslim communities were especially targeted for attacks by Sinhala Buddhist extremist organisation such as Bodu Bala Sena. In a recent attack against Muslims in an outskirt of Colombo by Bodu Bala Sena, a Muslim woman deeply affected by the wanton attacks against the Muslim community said that if LTTE leader Prahbakaran was alive, the Muslims would not have to face such cruel and inhumane acts.
Given the kind of attacks against Muslims, two main organisations, the All Ceylon Muslim Congress and Sri Lankan Muslim Congress withdrew their support from Rajapakse’s coalition to support Sirisena. With the entry of these two, a stage was set for the mobilisation of Muslim support for Sirisena. Muslims in Colombo, Puttalam, Ampara, and Batticola overwhelmingly supported Sirisena.
For Tamils and Muslims, Sirisena had nothing to offer in terms of getting their support. However, his campaign for democracy, ending corruption, cancelling the licences of two big casinos, and for the restoration of a two-term presidency, must have attracted Tamils and Muslims to a limited extent. Nonetheless, it should be clear to Sirisena and his new friends that without the support of the Tamils and Muslims, he would not have won the presidency, given the power of incumbency.
Rajapakse faced two surmountable problems that plagued his administrations. First was the problem of putting his family and close friends in high posts in the government. His two brothers – Basil and Gotabhaya – occupy senior posts in the government. Basil is the senior presidential advisor and Gotabhaya is the defence secretary, equivalent to the post of minister of defence. Three members of parliament from the south are his family members. It is said that his family members are in charge of five ministries that control 70 percent of the national budget.
Nepotism and cronyism notwithstanding, the second major problem of Rajapakse was the abolishment of the two-term presidency, as enshrined in the constitution. Rajapakse was two-terms in his office and decided to call for elections on Jan 8, 2015, to go for his third term. However, before this ,he used his parliamentary majority to bring about an amendment (18th amendment) to the constitution to allow himself to go for a third term.
As a result of a ruling by the Supreme Court, the incumbent president could call elections two years ahead of schedule. This was what Rajapakse did to gain power, but was vehemently opposed by the country’s Bar Association, the former chief justice of the Supreme Court Shirani Bandaranaike, and members of the opposition. Subsequently, Rajapakse impeached the chief justice and removed her from the office. Sirisena has promised that if he becomes the president, he would rehabilitate both Sarath Fonseka, who fell out of favour with Rajapakse, and Shirani Bandaranaike.
Wise move to take on Rajapakse
Sirisena will be next president of Sri Lanka. He won the elections not because he promised the heaven, but rather circumstances were much more favourable for him to take on Rajapakse. In fact, he was probably intelligent enough to realise that Rajapakse, despite his nationalistic credentials, was becoming a liability to the Sinhala people, especially the elites.
The criticisms from international human rights organisations about the way he conducted the war, the manner in which thousands of innocent Tamils were murdered, the continuing harassment of Tamils, disappearance of innocent people, land grab in Tamil areas, the attack against minorities, and other undemocratic and oppressive acts have made Rajapakse very unpopular in the civilised world.
Moreover, Rajapakse’s close association with China and Pakistan has alienated the Indian establishment to some extent. In fact, in the last few years after the end of civil war and with little or no development to address genuine Tamil concerns in the north and east, countries like India have been thinking of pursuing the option of regime change.
Given the fact that Sri Lanka falls without the orbit of India’s geopolitical sphere of influence, Rajapakse's regime has become an embarrassment to India. Even after the defeat of the LTTE in the bloody war, Rajapakse has not shown interest in addressing long-standing Tamil concerns. On the contrary, the end of civil war has meant not the end of misery of the Tamil people but the continuation of acts of oppression. Under these circumstances, Sri Lanka has shown no interest in advancing the option of federalism as envisaged in the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord of 1887.
While there is nothing by way development for Tamils, Rajapakse has sought to check Indian influence by giving a free hand to China and Pakistan. It was China’s economic and development assistance that has resulted in the building of ports and other major projects in Sri Lanka. Furthermore, allowing access to Chinese submarines to dock in Sri Lankan seaports has not gone well with India.
India might not have directly interfered in the electoral process, but its ubiquitous intelligence agencies are active and it might not be too incorrect even to tentatively suggest that India probably extended its intelligent arm to support the loose coalition of Sirisena, Wickramesinghe, and Kumaratunga!
Sirisena is no angel
The victory of Sirisena might have brought joy and happiness to some sections of the Tamil Diaspora. Fine, getting rid of “butcher” Rajapakse was something that Tamils in the north and east, victims of the 30-year war, desired. But Tamils having fought many Sinhala regimes in the past only know too well that Sirisena is no angel. In his campaign, he promised nothing to Tamils; he merely said that if elected, he would call for a more independent investigation to address Tamil human rights grievances.
There was nothing to address the concerns of the Muslims as well. Let us not forget, Sirisena was acting defence minister for the Rajapakse government during the height of civil war and before he parted company, was the secretary of Sri Lankan Freedom Party (SLFP) and former health minister.
In other words, why he departed suddenly to challenge Rajapakse would remain a mystery for some time to come. Apparently, in one of the interviews, he said that he lost confidence with Rajapakse as far back as 2006, but why then did he remain so long as his predecessor’s close confidante? While the TNA did the right thing to ask Tamils to vote in the elections, this should not be interpreted as support for Sirisena. Rather it was a protest vote against Rajapakse.
In the Tamil circles, there is also the lingering fear that their participation in the electoral process might dilute their pursuit of a separate country of Eelam. In the last few months or so, Tamil diaspora organisations such as the Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam based in United States have urged a referendum for Tamils whether they wish to opt for separate country or be part of the Sri Lankan political establishment.
Similarly, the Penang Tamil conference in November 2014, among its resolutions, called on the United Nations to conduct a referendum among Eelam Tamil regarding their political future. The history of estranged relations between Tamils and Sinhalese provided the grounds for the LTTE to take up armed struggle in 1977 for the pursuit of separate state.
Although the armed struggle has ceased, the option of separate state has gained ground, more at the political and diplomatic levels. So, if Tamil organisations called for the boycott of the recent elections, then this boycott must be understood in the larger backdrop of relationship between two principled nations, the failure of passive resistance, the move to take up arms, and finally, the urgings for international human rights investigation.
The ouster of Rajapakse was a good thing for Sri Lanka. Narendra Modi, the Prime Minister of India, was one of the leaders who responded early by congratulating Sirisena on his victory and extended invitation to visit India. India must be glad that a major embarrassment in the south has been removed democratically. British Prime Minister Cameron not only congratulated Sirisena, but asked him to allow for the unimpeded international investigation into human rights abuses in Sri Lanka.
It is hoped that the interest of democracy, justice and human rights, Sirisena takes up the challenges that were not addressed but swept under the carpet by Rajapakse.
P RAMASAMY is Perai assemblyperson and Penang deputy chief minister II.
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