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» State’s Secrets: the New York Times
» Cablegate: full texts at Wikileaks
Two companies in Malaysia have been named by the United States as being front companies for an Iranian-controlled network buying up missile technology from around the world.
A secret US diplomatic cable in February to the US embassy in Beijing sought China’s help to block a Chinese company from selling missile guidance gyroscopes to the Malaysian-based companies.The contents of the cable were published on Sunday at the Wikileaks whistleblower website together with 261 other secret cables, in a massive leak of US diplomatic secrets which has ruffled feathers in governments all over the world.
It is the second time in recent years that a Malaysian company has cropped up in the worldwide US-led campaign to contain Iran’s nuclear and missile ambitions.
Six years ago the US named a unit of the Scomi group of industrial companies controlled by Kamaluddin Abdullah Ahmad, son of the former prime minister, as having shipped to Iran components for enriching uranium, the nuclear fuel in power plants as well as nuclear weapons. (» Scomi nuclear scandal article at Wikipedia.) A Malaysian police investigation later closed the file on Scomi after reaching the conclusion that it was unclear that the components were meant for use in a nuclear facility.
On February 25 this year, the State Department gave guidance to its embassy in Beijing, on how to ask for China’s help in investigating the two companies for possibly flouting international sanctions against nuclear proliferation, and sanctions under the Missile Technology Control Regime.
The two Malaysian-based companies named in the US State Department cable are:
- Electronics Components Ltd
- Skylife Worldwide Sdn Bhd., which the State Department said was a front-company.
The cable referred to information provided to China in December last year about Electronic Components Ltd trying to buy TRS-500 gyroscopes from a Chinese firm. The gyroscopes could be used in the guidance systems of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles, the cable said.
The following is an extract of the relevant portions of the full cable as released by Wikileaks.
¶4. (S) Action Request: Request Embassy Beijing approach
appropriate host government officials to deliver talking
points/non-paper in paragraph 5 below and report response.
Talking points also may be provided as a non-paper.
¶5. (S) Begin talking points/non-paper:
(SECRET//REL CHINA)
–In December 2009, we shared with you information regarding
attempts by the Malaysia-based firm Electronics Component
Limited (ECL) to buy TRS-500 gyroscopes from the Chinese firm
VibTel Industrial Co. Inc.
–TRS-500 gyroscopes are controlled by the Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR) and China’s missile-related export
controls, and can be used in the guidance systems of
ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial
vehicles.
–We also noted that ECL is associated with a network of
Iranian-controlled front companies that procure sensitive
goods on behalf of a number of Iranian entities of
proliferation concern.
–In response to this information, you agreed to look into
this matter, but asked if the United States could provide
additional details on ECL’s relationships with firms in Iran.
–We now want to provide you with additional information
indicating that ECL is part of a network of
Iranian-controlled front companies that includes the Iranian
firm Shahin Sefid Esta and the Malaysia-based front company
Skylife Worldwide Sdn Bhd.
–This network procures sensitive goods on behalf of a number
of Iranian entities of proliferation concern, including the
Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG), which is Iran’s
primary developer of liquid propellant ballistic missiles,
and Heavy Metal Industries, a front company for the tactical
missile developer Ya Mahdi Industries.
–Both SHIG and Ya Mahdi Industries are sanctioned under
United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1737.
–Additionally, the TRS-500 gyroscopes are controlled items
that would be prohibited from being exported to Iran under
UNSCR 1737.
–We hope this information is useful in supporting your
efforts in this case and assists your ability to prevent the
transfer of these gyroscopes by VibTel Industrial Co. to ECL.
Wikileaks is releasing in batches the full text of 251,287 secret diplomatic cables from US embassies around the world. The contents of all the cables are available for viewing as well as for download.appropriate host government officials to deliver talking
points/non-paper in paragraph 5 below and report response.
Talking points also may be provided as a non-paper.
¶5. (S) Begin talking points/non-paper:
(SECRET//REL CHINA)
–In December 2009, we shared with you information regarding
attempts by the Malaysia-based firm Electronics Component
Limited (ECL) to buy TRS-500 gyroscopes from the Chinese firm
VibTel Industrial Co. Inc.
–TRS-500 gyroscopes are controlled by the Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR) and China’s missile-related export
controls, and can be used in the guidance systems of
ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial
vehicles.
–We also noted that ECL is associated with a network of
Iranian-controlled front companies that procure sensitive
goods on behalf of a number of Iranian entities of
proliferation concern.
–In response to this information, you agreed to look into
this matter, but asked if the United States could provide
additional details on ECL’s relationships with firms in Iran.
–We now want to provide you with additional information
indicating that ECL is part of a network of
Iranian-controlled front companies that includes the Iranian
firm Shahin Sefid Esta and the Malaysia-based front company
Skylife Worldwide Sdn Bhd.
–This network procures sensitive goods on behalf of a number
of Iranian entities of proliferation concern, including the
Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG), which is Iran’s
primary developer of liquid propellant ballistic missiles,
and Heavy Metal Industries, a front company for the tactical
missile developer Ya Mahdi Industries.
–Both SHIG and Ya Mahdi Industries are sanctioned under
United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1737.
–Additionally, the TRS-500 gyroscopes are controlled items
that would be prohibited from being exported to Iran under
UNSCR 1737.
–We hope this information is useful in supporting your
efforts in this case and assists your ability to prevent the
transfer of these gyroscopes by VibTel Industrial Co. to ECL.
Copies of the cables were also released in advance to the Guardian newspaper in London, the New York Times, and Der Spiegel (Germany), Le Monde (France), and El Pais (Spain) which have published some of the cables after redacting (editing out) the identities of selected individuals who might be placed in danger.
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