When we say BN leadership, it must be pointed out that BN was always helmed by the Umno president. Other office-bearers such as deputy chair, secretary-general and the treasurer-general of BN were also always from Umno. Therefore, BN's policies were largely dictated by Umno. In the recent history of BN, there was only one brief moment where former MCA president Dr Ling Liong Sik had to chair a BN meeting just to allow Umno Baru as a coalition member into BN during the Umno turmoil in 1988.
If we look at the past, there were three key policies of Umno and BN followed so religiously that they resulted in MIC's sorry state of affairs today.
Although Samy Vellu cannot be exonerated from his failed leadership and wrongdoings, it is these policies of Umno and BN that gave him a freehand to deal with party matters the way he wanted without any regard for democracy.
Non-interference in internal affairs of component parties
This policy was so strictly followed by former premier Dr Mahathir Mohamad as BN chairperson and his successors to the extent that even though they knew something was going wrong in MIC they went ahead to condone it in the name of 'non-interference'.
However, this policy was not that strictly followed during the times of Tunku Abdul Rahman or Tun Abdul Razak as BN was then considered one big political family. It was common knowledge that Tun Abdul Razak played a mediating role between VT Sambanthan and V Manickavasagam during their leadership tussle for MIC in 1973, whereby he brokered a deal asking Sambanthan to resign and Manickavasagam to take over the leadership.
There were also several occasions when the BN leadership had interfered in the leadership tussles of MCA.
However, during the reign of Mahathir, this policy of 'non-interference' was followed strictly by him just to ensure that the other component parties do not interfere in the leadership tussles of Umno. Mahathir knew that if the component parties began to take sides in Umno's leadership tussles then BN would be split and the power of Umno as the supreme controlling party in BN would be lost. It was during his time that the most number of leadership tussles took place in Umno resulting in three deputy premiers being changed over a period of 22 years.
For example, in May 1981, Samy Vellu brought a motion in the central working committee (CWC) to expel his deputy S Subramaniam from the party and the BN leadership knowing very well that it would eventually split the party and affect BN, did not do anything about it. The motion was later withdrawn by Samy Vellu after a private chat between him and Subramaniam.
However, a few years later Samy Vellu expelled V Govindaraj who was then a vice-president of the party. Govindraj formed his own political party Democratic Malaysian Indian Party (DMIP) but in later years dismantled it to join back MIC at the invitation of Samy Vellu.
In 1988, Samy Vellu expelled MG Pandithan who was also a vice- president then. He went on to form another political party Indian Progressive Front (IPF) with a substantial number of his followers. The party remains till today but is riddled with political infighting and factionalism.
In 1988 alone, Samy Vellu closed more than 300 branches which resulted in thousands of MIC members kept outside MIC, some of whom although very talented with leadership qualities could not find their political rise even today.
Worse still, proper programmes were not drawn up by the MIC leadership to recruit new and young members even though the young Indian population was growing every year.
The BN leadership was aware of the unhealthy developments in MIC and the Indian community but chose not to do anything because even with all these nonsense, MIC candidates were still winning general elections by contesting in Malay majority seats because Umno was able to deliver the Malay votes en bloc to the MIC candidates.
Adding to the problems in MIC were the woes of Maika Holdings' shareholders. Since 1984 so many things, including the hijacking of nine million Telekom shares, went wrong but again the BN leadership (which means Mahathir) only chose to remain a silent witness to all the atrocities that were perpetrated.
Today, Maika Holdings remains a skeleton. The only jewel in the crown - Oriental Capital Assurance Bhd - has been put up for sale only to be blocked by an injunction by Nesa Cooperative and some other shareholders. Again the BN leadership did not 'interfere' although they knew that the controversial issues surrounding Maika Holdings were affecting the sentiments of Indian voters to vote in favour of MIC or BN.
By 2008, the Indian voters outside of MIC and the families of Maika Holdings' shareholders who had lost their hard-earned investments in the company had ballooned to a sizeable number and eventually they became anti-MIC and anti-BN. The only problem was that during all these years there was no alternative political platform available for the Indian voters to switch their allegiance away from BN.
However, when that political platform was formulated and presented by Anwar Ibrahim coupled with the developments in respect of Hindraf, the Indian voters ditched BN and went ahead to vote for the opposition front. When a substantial portion of Malay voters too decided to vote for the opposition, it was a disaster for MIC candidates who had always been contesting in the Malay majority seats which also had a sizeable number of Indian voters.
Therefore, it was this policy of 'non-interference' by Umno and BN that encouraged Samy Vellu to do all that he wanted to do which had resulted in MIC facing its worst crisis today.
Even after the 2008 general election debacle when every party in BN including Umno was undergoing leadership transitions, the BN leadership under Prime Minister Najib Abdul Razak did not do anything when Samy Vellu announced he would seek re-election as president again in May 2009. Samy Vellu even announced that he would continue as president until 2012 and the BN leadership again remained silent in the name of 'non- interference'.
With all the damage having been done and only after the recent critical views of Mahathir on Samy Vellu, Najib came forward to announce that he would discuss with Samy Vellu about his leadership transition plans.
Now, is not 'discussing MIC's leadership transition' with its party president interference into the affairs of another political party?
Listening only to the president
The BN leadership always followed the policy of listening only to the party presidents of the component parties and acted as though the views of other leaders in the party were irrelevant.
For example, in the 1990 general election, Samy Vellu chose to drop Subramaniam and P Pathmanaban as candidates, who were then the party's duly elected deputy president and vice-president respectively. They were also popular in the party and the Indian community. It was Mahathir as prime minister and BN chairperson who consented to Samy Vellu's unfair decision of dropping these two leaders as candidates in the general election.
However, Mahathir must also be credited for taking a firm stand after the 1990 general election by not allowing Samy Vellu to nominate candidates of his choice as deputy ministers. Instead Mahathir insisted and succeeded in bringing back Subramaniam as deputy minister again, a decision which gave the space for Subramaniam to gain back his deputy president's position again in the party in the following years.
Again in 2004 general election Samy Vellu dropped a bombshell by not nominating Subramaniam as a candidate for Parliament even though he was the duly elected deputy president. This time it was Abdullah Ahmad Badawi as prime minister and BN chair who consented. The overwhelming success of BN in the 2004 general election silenced the outcry over Subramaniam's exclusion as a parliamentary candidate.
Indian academics and community leaders alike always had reservations about building a separate university for Indians who formed only about eight percent of the population. However, Samy Vellu began building the Aimst University and it is estimated that to date the government would have channeled about RM300 million towards the university just because of listening only to the party president.
If the RM300 million had been properly utilised for the benefit of the Indian community many dire needs of the Indian community such as the plight of Tamil schools and financial assistance for needy students could have been solved. However the BN leadership just listened to Samy Vellu as party president without any consideration whether the funds that are given by the government were being used for the real needs of the Indian community.
Not allowing another Indian political party into BN
Word has it that when Pandithan was heading IPF, he submitted an application to join BN which was brought up in one of the BN supreme council meetings chaired by Mahathir. In that meeting Samy Vellu voiced his objections for IPF's entry into BN and even said “that MIC will remain outside BN if IPF is admitted.”
Needless to say there were no further deliberations on the matter and since then BN had never considered bringing another Indian-based political party into BN. So there was a situation where the number of Indians unable to join MIC and remaining outside the party continued to grow and even if they were supporters of BN there was no other Indian party in BN through which they could serve and support BN.
That is how the bulk of them ended up supporting Pakatan Rakyat parties like DAP and PKR to the extent that there is even a PAS Indian supporters club today.
Some may argue that the Indians wanting to support BN could have joined other multi-racial parties like Gerakan or PPP.
The Indians, due to historical reasons always had some form of attachment towards MIC and were not in favour of joining or supporting other multi-racial parties in BN. As for Gerakan, except in recent times, the party was always behaving as an alternative Chinese party to MCA and not as a true multi-racial party and therefore the Indians were reluctant to join Gerakan.
When M Kayveas took over as PPP president, there were widespread hopes that the party even though termed multi-racial could turn into an alternative force to MIC within BN. However, to the dismay of many, the leadership of Kayveas was no better than that of Samy Vellu and some MIC members who had flocked to PPP deserting MIC later left PPP complaining "Samy Vellu's leadership looks better than that of Kayveas."
What the BN leadership should have done over the years is to harness the support of the Indians outside MIC by allowing another Indian political party into BN which would have acted as a check and balance on MIC simultaneously avoiding erosion of support for BN from the Indian community.
Furthermore, the competition between two Indian-based political parties within BN would have only increased the participation and voice of Indians in the BN. With alternative or contradicting views from both factions a better formulae to really help the Indian community could have been achieved.
With a second political party in BN the Indian community may not have gone behind a movement like Hindraf as they would have found an alternative political forum.
Only when Indian voters have gone to the opposition for good, is the BN leadership coming forward to mend fences by making direct contact with the Indian community. Najib's visit to Batu Caves and his grant of RM1 million to the Sri Murugan Centre which conducts tuition centers for Indian students are examples of how the new BN leadership operates by sidestepping MIC in addressing issues concerning the Indian community. It must be pointed out that in both the above functions Samy Vellu was conspicuously absent.
Is there a solution now?
If the BN wants to get back the support of the Indian community there is one solution. Allow one or even two Indian-based political parties into BN.
In this regard Najib could learn from what his father did in the 1970's. Tun Razak even brought opposition parties like PAS, PPP and Gerakan into the BN fold, which only strengthened BN to win back the people's support in the 1974 general election.
Since MIC was united and strong in the 1970's, probably there was no need to admit another Indian party into BN. It is also doubtful whether any other Indian political party existed then.
What Najib needs to do today is not to bring back opposition parties into BN or only talk to PAS for the sake of Malay unity but to bring the various Indian factions supporting BN directly into BN through other Indian-based political parties. However small this support may be, it will only go to strengthen BN in garnering the Indian voters.
Najib should implement this reform in BN even if MIC threatens to leave BN as by doing so MIC would only be performing 'harakiri' (suicide) at this stage.
The time has come for parties like MIC and MCA to realise that when they contest in the general election they contest under the BN symbol and not their own symbols and therefore interests and views of the larger section of the community must also be considered. MCA and MIC in claiming to represent their respective communities should act like true representatives of their community with mutual consideration for other popular leaders within their party and those outside the party.
Even if the leadership of MIC changes today it is doubtful whether the Indian political factions outside MIC would come forward to support the new leadership of MIC under (current number two and heir apparent) G Palanivel. Even within the party it must be remembered that a large number of delegates voted against Palanivel in the contest for deputy president.
Therefore, the only way out for the BN leadership is to embrace the Indian voters outside MIC by channeling their support through a second political party in BN.
Even if the BN leadership is able to achieve this gigantic task, they should not continue to follow the old policies of 'non-interference' and 'listening only to the president'.
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