COMMENT The
relationship between the concept of democracy and civil society is
central to understanding the dynamics of the Malaysian system. The
general concept of civil society goes back to antiquity as an arena
between the state and the people; and took a peculiar meaning in the
1970s, an era marked by the political upheaval in Eastern Europe. Since
then the concept of civil society has been prescribed as a pre-requisite
for democracy and democratisation.
Civil society has become a prism through which developing countries are
evaluated by international agencies: “good” or “bad” governance, or
“dictatorship or democracy”. Civil society would be one of the numerous
milestones to pass when achieving a complete democratisation.
The growth and vibrancy of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) as a
main component of civil society, is utilised as an indicator of
“progress” and the “quality of the NGOs and their network” has turned
into a measure to evaluate the level of democratisation. NGOs have
become a gauge of good governance - or at least improved governance.
This definition puts democracy as a system guaranteed and sustained by
the existence of a civil society as the strongest and unquestionable
bastion against abuse by the state apparatus.
Interestingly the nature of NGOs is rarely challenged except when
carrying religious messages, and more specifically towards Islam. Great
attention has been paid to Islamic NGOs whose ideological inclinations
have raised doubts, even more so in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in
New York.
In Malaysia, most NGOs are understood as occupying the political space
in opposition to the ruling party in general, and thus to Umno. In fact,
any mention of pro-governmental NGOs remains rare in the analysis of
Malaysian politics.
However, there is a division within pro-opposition civil society
organisations: between the Islamist on the one hand and the secular or
non-religious organisations on the other. Thus when we look at
connivance militants we are looking at a large slice of the public
sphere that has been totally ignored.
The civil bluff
The independence of NGOs in the public sphere is questionable in Malaysia.
A large number of NGOs in Malaysia are in fact embodying the interest of
political parties, in different aspects; such as diffusing the party’s
idea, supporting the party’s idea, supporting and/or getting involved in
its public actions, initiating political action such as demonstrations
or violence serving the party’s interest. Lee Hock Guan (2004) reminds
us that the limitations of the concept have not stopped observers,
academics, and activists from using the term while being inspired from
its western interpretation.
But its definition should rather go along the parameters of the local political context.
Civil society in Malaysia dates back to the pre-independence period,
when nationalism and political emancipation from colonial rule and most
importantly citizenship rights, were organising forces.
From the 1970s, the number of organisations, mostly crafted along ethnic
lines more so than classist division due to deeply entrenched ethnic
sentiments, continued to grow but “this growth did not necessarily
translate into a democratisation process in all of them” since
governments used and implemented a “combination of legal and coercive
instruments to exert control” (Lee 2004:12).
Ramasamy (2004) explores an alternative perspective according which: (1)
The state and civil society are not antagonistic, but share a
relationship in the enforcement of domination; (2) Civil society is
divided by pro and opponents to the state; (3) The state seeks to
dominate civil society; (4) Civil society is an arena of contestation;
the dominant will then own a method for manufacturing consent necessary
for political domination; (5) It is an arena for competition and
conflict of ideas in which the state may not dominate as non-state
forces are participating.
However in Malaysia, the perception of civil society as being in
opposition to the state, and the assumption that there exists a deep
political divide between the two is still common. This view does not pay
much attention to groups, or organisation, in association to the state
or to political parties, more specifically to the ruling party. The way
the NGO scene has been portrayed in the literature raises a few problems
despite the warning by Lee (2004) and Ramasamy (2004).
The concepts of NGO and civil society, as understood in western
literature, is inadequate for the Malaysian context for two main
reasons: (1) NGO are by definition non-governmental and that implies
independence vis-à-vis the state and the government, and (2) the idea
that civil society is often described as being an opposition force to
governmental or state power.
This simply means that the existence of NGOs that is pro-governmental or
in close relationship to political parties, and even sometimes shadow
surrogates of the state authority, has been completely ignored.
Protean disguise
Since the creation of the Federation of Malaysia in its contemporary
geographical boundaries, the expressions of Malay nationalism were
mainly to be found in the discourse and actions of the ruling party
(Umno) and its Youth Wing (Pemuda Umno). While the Islamist party PAS
was (and remains) the traditional ambassador of a more religiously
conservative part of the Malay community.
The emergence of new ethno-nationalist groups endorsed by the party’s
old guard can be interpreted as a sub-contraction of Umno’s pro-Malay
discourse. The rising of these new groups pushing the ketuanan Melayu
(Malay supremacy) rhetoric should be seen as the preliminary emergence
of a new fringe of civil society.
These new entities were acting as pressure groups on the government by
creating a non-party (and non-state) right wing - but until 2008 were
not yet seen as constitutive of a coherent movement.
The realities of the political system are a summation of practices,
mostly beyond the state’s legal frame, used to perpetuate power. The
reality this research exposes is the creation of umbrella entities that
were created to institutionalise and thus legalise the relationship
between gangs and the ruling party.
The liberalisation of the public sphere and the creation of new spaces
of expression such as “civil society;” creates a façade of free
expression and development of “independent” bodies outside of the realm
of the state - the non-governmental organisations - have set the ground
for such institutionalisation.
The very existence, and need, for civil society has indeed favoured the
development of this relationship while allowing the political
involvement of gangs to be legalised through the creation of umbrella
NGOs. This relationship - key to our study - has not been explored fully
and the existence of pro-governmental NGO created to support the ruling
party has been mostly ignored.
In Malaysia “civil society” is in fact an aggregate of non-governmental
organisations whose official purpose is to represent the people’s
interests, framed by political and legal fetters that limit their
actions. This virtual space should be seen as a civil extension of the
political spheres where political parties’ surrogates and/or connivance
militants, debate, demonstrate, and fight, arbitrated by the state
rules.
In that sense, civil society is a tool to create an official and legal
umbrella for gangs and thus institutionalise their relationship with the
ruling party.
The institutionalisation of gangs to NGOs has been initiated by the
opportunities that arise in the post-Mahathir Mohamad era. These
opportunities emerged from exogenous and endogenous factors. First,
following the resignation of Mahathir, there emerged a new space for
NGOs created by the liberalisation of civil society.
Secondly, in this context of relative liberalisation, the ruling party
has had to face growing discontent relayed primarily through the
alternative media and a stronger opposition. Some ruling party leaders
have had the need for connivance militants. Thirdly, the leadership
crisis that occurred at the death of PLB in 2006 precipitates the split
of Pekida into several new branches each of which created its own NGO
chapters to access the market of political militancy.
Informed observers have not noticed the presence of gangs in the
political landscape mostly because these gangs are disguising
(travestying) themselves. This potential to adapt to survive in any
context has led these entities to adopt a timely form to publicise part
of their activity (political militancy) while protecting others (illegal
business). The political activities of connivance militants oscillate
between the legal and illegal, licit and illicit.
Gangs have travestied into NGOs; traversing the frontier from the
underground world to the light of the public sphere in order to offer
support to political parties. In a different political, sociological,
historical and geographical context, the ideological umbrella could have
been leftist, anarchist, or feminist, etc; and the main patron of these
movements could have been any other political party in need for support
- whether a ruling party or an opposition party.
It is clear that the development of connivance militancy is favoured by a
state’s opaqueness; nevertheless connivance militants groups may exist
in every context. Their nature and action shaped according to the
geographical, political, social and historical singularities.
Gangs are not just used as entrepreneurs of violence, but are part of
the process of legitimising authoritarian power, a complex system not
limited to Malaysia alone. With the new political challenges facing the
ruling party vis-à-vis the rise of the opposition, a need for
reinforcing the system emerged. This need explains the reason why the
political role of gangs has grown since 2008.
Nevertheless, the empowerment of gangs and the newly gained confidence
of their leaders have fostered new ambitions. Some gang leaders, fearing
a change of government and in the interest of preserving their access
to resources, have turned to the opposition. This change in allegiance
shows, as well, that the state system of legitimation has reached its
limits, challenged by growing citizen awareness and increased access to
alternative political discourse.
Gangs are part of the political system and should not be seen as an
ephemeral phenomenon but rather structural entities with relative
influence on the political scene, and able to adapt to contextual
changes.
Part I:
Gangsta to the roots - a Gangsta's paradise
Part II:
Gangsta to the roots - Gangsta through the years
Part III:
Gangsta beyond stereotypes
SOPHIE LEMIÈRE is the Jean Monnet Post-doctoral Fellow at the European
University Institute, Florence, Italy. She holds a PhD and a Masters in
Comparative Politics from Sciences-Po (France). She is the author of
Misplaced Democracy: Malaysian Politics and People. The above first
appeared in
New Mandala.
Deputy Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin (left) had recently said that the cabinet was kept in the dark regarding Zahid's letter.
“I think the best way is that we no longer compromise with them [criminal suspects],” remarked Zahid (left in photo) at a security briefing to scores of community leaders in Malacca in early October last year.
Now
it seems that Zahid has gone out on a limb and done precisely that: he
wrote a letter to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, vouching for the
bona fides of a criminal suspect, a Malaysian under indictment in the
United States for running a gambling racket during soccer’s World Cup in
June.
In particular, Rafizi stressed, it was important to determine how many such letters have been issued so far.
"Even
the Mafia in the United states in the 1920s-1930s did not dare do so
and did things in secret," he said when winding up during the committee
stage of the debate.
Che
Mohamad Zulkifly added that the amendment to Sosma may not even be
used, like many existing provisions of the law, so there is no need to
worry.
Ahmad
Zahid was speaking at a ‘security briefing ceremony with community
leaders’ last Saturday in what appeared to be a government function that
turned into an Umno affair.
Based
on the recording, Ahmad Zahid said about 28,000 of more than 40,000
gang members identified are Indian Malaysians and there is nothing wrong
in arresting them.
Ahmad
Zahid also proudly declared that the amendment to the Prevention of
Crime Act 1959 (PCA) that reintroduces detention without trial was his
own law.
After being informed of the limitations of the Act by the police, Ahmad Zahid (left in photo) said he pushed for cabinet approval for amendments to the PCA before tabling it in the Dewan Rakyat.