COMMENT Mahinda Rajapakse despite
his nationalist appeal lost his bid for a third-term presidency in Sri
Lanka. He gained 47.58 percent of votes whereas his former colleague and
recently turned opponent, Maithripala Sirisena, obtained 51.28 percent
of votes. It was a surprise for Sri Lankans as well as for outsiders.
Many believed that there was nothing to stop Rajapakse from going for
his third term in the elections held on 8 Jan 2015.
Sirisena, who quit his post in the cabinet of Rajapakse in November last
year, had been doing his homework for some time. Eventually, just
before the elections, he teamed up with Ranil Wickramasinghe, the leader
of the United National Party (UNP); Chandrika Kumaratunga, the former
president of Sri Lanka; the former chief justice Shirani Bandaranaike;
and other prominent leaders to form a loose coalition to unseat
Rajapakse. Rajapakse said that Sirisena “stabbed” him from the rear!
There was a common thinking in Rajapakse’s close circles that the
incumbent might not face much difficulty in the contest and given the
expected solid support from the Sinhala south, the gains that might
accrue from Tamil and Muslim communities to Sirisena could be easily
offset.
But alas, this was not what happened. Rajapakse not only lost the
support of Tamils and Muslims but also from the majority of the
Sinhalese. In the north central of the country and other places of
Sinhala concentrations, Sirisena obtained the support of the voters. In
Tamil areas such as Vanni, Jaffna, Trincomalee, Ampara, and Batticola,
voter turnout averaged 75 percent, much higher than previous elections.
In the Muslim areas of Puttalam, Ampara, Colombo, and others, voters
shied away from Rajapakse to vote for Sirisena.
Amongst Tamils, although there were urgings to boycott the presidential
elections, the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) which controls the northern
province, took the stand that it would urge Tamils to vote against
Rajapakse by supporting Sirisena. It is not that Tamils thought that
Sirisena would be able to address their problems, they felt that by
voting against the “known enemy”, they might be registering their
protest vote for the knowledge of the international community.
The urging for boycott by some Tamil diaspora organisations, although
well-intended, failed to appreciate the historic choice available to
Tamils and how they could exercise their democratic right in a small
measure to bring about long-term desired changes in the country.
Muslim dilemma in Sri Lanka
The Muslims being a smaller minority than the Tamils always faced a
dilemma as how to respond to changes in the country dominated by the
Buddhist majority Sinhalese. For a long time, despite the injustices
meted out to them by the Sinhala racist governments, the Sri Lankan
Muslim community, given the division in the leadership, invariably went
along with the ruling Sinhala elite. In the course of time, they had to
pay dearly for their blind loyalty.
During the Rajapakse administration, Muslim communities were especially
targeted for attacks by Sinhala Buddhist extremist organisation such as
Bodu Bala Sena. In a recent attack against Muslims in an outskirt of
Colombo by Bodu Bala Sena, a Muslim woman deeply affected by the wanton
attacks against the Muslim community said that if LTTE leader
Prahbakaran was alive, the Muslims would not have to face such cruel and
inhumane acts.
Given the kind of attacks against Muslims, two main organisations, the
All Ceylon Muslim Congress and Sri Lankan Muslim Congress withdrew their
support from Rajapakse’s coalition to support Sirisena. With the entry
of these two, a stage was set for the mobilisation of Muslim support
for Sirisena. Muslims in Colombo, Puttalam, Ampara, and Batticola
overwhelmingly supported Sirisena.
For Tamils and Muslims, Sirisena had nothing to offer in terms of
getting their support. However, his campaign for democracy, ending
corruption, cancelling the licences of two big casinos, and for the
restoration of a two-term presidency, must have attracted Tamils and
Muslims to a limited extent. Nonetheless, it should be clear to Sirisena
and his new friends that without the support of the Tamils and Muslims,
he would not have won the presidency, given the power of incumbency.
Rajapakse faced two surmountable problems that plagued his
administrations. First was the problem of putting his family and close
friends in high posts in the government. His two brothers – Basil and
Gotabhaya – occupy senior posts in the government. Basil is the senior
presidential advisor and Gotabhaya is the defence secretary, equivalent
to the post of minister of defence. Three members of parliament from the
south are his family members. It is said that his family members are in
charge of five ministries that control 70 percent of the national
budget.
Nepotism and cronyism notwithstanding, the second major problem of
Rajapakse was the abolishment of the two-term presidency, as enshrined
in the constitution. Rajapakse was two-terms in his office and decided
to call for elections on Jan 8, 2015, to go for his third term. However,
before this ,he used his parliamentary majority to bring about an
amendment (18th amendment) to the constitution to allow himself to go for a third term.
As a result of a ruling by the Supreme Court, the incumbent president
could call elections two years ahead of schedule. This was what
Rajapakse did to gain power, but was vehemently opposed by the country’s
Bar Association, the former chief justice of the Supreme Court Shirani
Bandaranaike, and members of the opposition. Subsequently, Rajapakse
impeached the chief justice and removed her from the office. Sirisena
has promised that if he becomes the president, he would rehabilitate
both Sarath Fonseka, who fell out of favour with Rajapakse, and Shirani
Bandaranaike.
Wise move to take on Rajapakse
Sirisena will be next president of Sri Lanka. He won the elections not
because he promised the heaven, but rather circumstances were much more
favourable for him to take on Rajapakse. In fact, he was probably
intelligent enough to realise that Rajapakse, despite his nationalistic
credentials, was becoming a liability to the Sinhala people, especially
the elites.
The criticisms from international human rights organisations about the
way he conducted the war, the manner in which thousands of innocent
Tamils were murdered, the continuing harassment of Tamils, disappearance
of innocent people, land grab in Tamil areas, the attack against
minorities, and other undemocratic and oppressive acts have made
Rajapakse very unpopular in the civilised world.
Moreover, Rajapakse’s close association with China and Pakistan has
alienated the Indian establishment to some extent. In fact, in the last
few years after the end of civil war and with little or no development
to address genuine Tamil concerns in the north and east, countries like
India have been thinking of pursuing the option of regime change.
Given the fact that Sri Lanka falls without the orbit of India’s
geopolitical sphere of influence, Rajapakse's regime has become an
embarrassment to India. Even after the defeat of the LTTE in the bloody
war, Rajapakse has not shown interest in addressing long-standing Tamil
concerns. On the contrary, the end of civil war has meant not the end of
misery of the Tamil people but the continuation of acts of oppression.
Under these circumstances, Sri Lanka has shown no interest in advancing
the option of federalism as envisaged in the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord of
1887.
While there is nothing by way development for Tamils, Rajapakse has
sought to check Indian influence by giving a free hand to China and
Pakistan. It was China’s economic and development assistance that has
resulted in the building of ports and other major projects in Sri Lanka.
Furthermore, allowing access to Chinese submarines to dock in Sri
Lankan seaports has not gone well with India.
India might not have directly interfered in the electoral process, but
its ubiquitous intelligence agencies are active and it might not be too
incorrect even to tentatively suggest that India probably extended its
intelligent arm to support the loose coalition of Sirisena,
Wickramesinghe, and Kumaratunga!
Sirisena is no angel
The victory of Sirisena might have brought joy and happiness to some
sections of the Tamil Diaspora. Fine, getting rid of “butcher” Rajapakse
was something that Tamils in the north and east, victims of the 30-year
war, desired. But Tamils having fought many Sinhala regimes in the past
only know too well that Sirisena is no angel. In his campaign, he
promised nothing to Tamils; he merely said that if elected, he would
call for a more independent investigation to address Tamil human rights
grievances.
There was nothing to address the concerns of the Muslims as well. Let us
not forget, Sirisena was acting defence minister for the Rajapakse
government during the height of civil war and before he parted company,
was the secretary of Sri Lankan Freedom Party (SLFP) and former health
minister.
In other words, why he departed suddenly to challenge Rajapakse would
remain a mystery for some time to come. Apparently, in one of the
interviews, he said that he lost confidence with Rajapakse as far back
as 2006, but why then did he remain so long as his predecessor’s close
confidante? While the TNA did the right thing to ask Tamils to vote in
the elections, this should not be interpreted as support for Sirisena.
Rather it was a protest vote against Rajapakse.
In the Tamil circles, there is also the lingering fear that their
participation in the electoral process might dilute their pursuit of a
separate country of Eelam. In the last few months or so, Tamil diaspora
organisations such as the Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam based
in United States have urged a referendum for Tamils whether they wish to
opt for separate country or be part of the Sri Lankan political
establishment.
Similarly, the Penang Tamil conference in November 2014, among its
resolutions, called on the United Nations to conduct a referendum among
Eelam Tamil regarding their political future. The history of estranged
relations between Tamils and Sinhalese provided the grounds for the LTTE
to take up armed struggle in 1977 for the pursuit of separate state.
Although the armed struggle has ceased, the option of separate state has
gained ground, more at the political and diplomatic levels. So, if
Tamil organisations called for the boycott of the recent elections, then
this boycott must be understood in the larger backdrop of relationship
between two principled nations, the failure of passive resistance, the
move to take up arms, and finally, the urgings for international human
rights investigation.
The ouster of Rajapakse was a good thing for Sri Lanka. Narendra Modi,
the Prime Minister of India, was one of the leaders who responded early
by congratulating Sirisena on his victory and extended invitation to
visit India. India must be glad that a major embarrassment in the south
has been removed democratically. British Prime Minister Cameron not only
congratulated Sirisena, but asked him to allow for the unimpeded
international investigation into human rights abuses in Sri Lanka.
It is hoped that the interest of democracy, justice and human rights,
Sirisena takes up the challenges that were not addressed but swept under
the carpet by Rajapakse.
P RAMASAMY is Perai assemblyperson and Penang deputy chief minister II.
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